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The study deepens our understanding of business marketing by looking beyond the individual 
choices of business actors to the role of consent between interacting actors. Based on an 
empirical investigation of manufacturers and retailers in Germany and drawing from previous 
research on business relationships, the paper develops a theoretical structure for the analysis of 
consent in business marketing. The paper argues for a shift from a view of individual choice as 
the basis of business marketing towards the idea of choice being part of an evolutionary 
discursive practice of consent. The study detects the mediating role of consent at four levels:  
1) as a stratifying process, 2) as recursive practice, 3) as energizing interaction, and 4) as 
economizing activities, resources and actors; it elaborates significant theoretical implications 
and highlights managerial lessons. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines how the giving and receiving of consent between companies affects 
business marketing.  Consent means that an agreement among actors has been reached; hence, 
consent occurs when an actor agrees to a proposal made by another actor. For example, in the 
annual trade negotiations between manufacturers and retailers, consent occurs when upon a 




retailer’s request, a manufacturer agrees to offer private labels or bespoke consumer and trade 
promotions to a retailer; or for example, when a retailer agrees to distribute manufacturer 
brands or provide incremental shelf for brand extensions that a manufacturer has proposed. 
Similarly, consent occurs when business actors agree to develop environmentally friendly 
offerings, develop new business, enter new segments, or distribution channels.  In all these 
examples, the giving and receiving of consent between interacting business actors would affect 
their individual choices. For this reason, informed and voluntary consent matters in several 
contexts, such as in business, law, research, medicine, as well as personal relationships 
(Barnett, 1986; Buchanan & Tullock, 1999; Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Scary, 2014); thus, 
consent is regarded as the foundation for the legal enforceability of contracts (Barnett, 1986, 
1992; Bar-Gill, 2012; Mouzas & Blois, 2013; Mouzas, 2016).    
 
We posit that consent between companies is one of the missing pieces of the puzzle of what 
happens when business marketers and their business customers seek a jointly agreed action.  
There is a scarcity of discussion about the role of consent in business marketing because our 
hitherto understanding in marketing has largely been shaped by the choice perspective (Child, 
1997; Beckert, 1997; Williamson, 2002). The choice perspective centers on the decision-
making processes of corporate and individual business actors.  The choice perspective builds 
on the core theoretical constructs of corporate direction, industry and competition analysis 
(Ansoff, 1970; Porter, 1981; 2008; Pettigrew, 2014).  Specifically, in marketing the choice 
perspective was initially expressed in terms of the ‘marketing decision variables’ (Howard, 
1957) which evolved into the concept of a marketing-mix (Kelley & Lazer, 1958) and the “four 
P’s” (McCarthy, 1960; Kotler 1967) that business actors would apply.  Nonetheless, the choice 
perspective has been mediated by a continuing debate about the connectivity between the actor 
and its context (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990; Barney, 1991). Previous debates have been 




confronted by calls to develop relational perspectives that recognize the interdependencies 
among individually significant customers and suppliers within complex inter-firm networks 
(Håkansson et al., 2009; Day, 2000; Ford & Mouzas, 2013; Lush, Vargo & Tanniru, 2010; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2011).  
 
Drawing from relational perspectives on business networks and conducting an empirical 
investigation on business relationships between manufacturers of consumer brands, such as 
Mars, Kellogg, Nestlé, and Unilever as well as grocery retailers, such as Wal-Mart, Metro, 
Rewe, Lidl and Aldi (Villas-Boas & Zhao, 2005), we ask the following research question: 
How does the giving and receiving of consent between suppliers and customers affect their 
business marketing?  
 
By addressing this research question, the present study develops a theoretical framework that 
seeks to advance our understanding of the mediating role of consent in business marketing. The 
study challenges common beliefs about actors’ independent decision-making and contributes 
to the theory of business marketing by highlighting the mediating role of consent as: 1) 
stratifying process, 2) recursive practice, 3) energizing interaction, and 4) economizing 
activities, resources and actors. The contribution brings new insights into an interactive 
practice through which multiple consents are sought, modified and given between variously 
interconnected counterparts. This contribution is relevant today because at a time of rapid 
advances in telecommunication and global interconnectivity between suppliers and customers, 
it complements and re-directs the idea of choice in business marketing away from a discrete 
and independent decision-making towards the idea of choice being part of an evolutionary 
discursive practice of consent among business actors.  
  




2. FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT   
The choice perspective is concerned with how actors make choices. Williamson (2002, p. 172) 
identifies two parallel theoretical constructions within the choice perspective: “the theory of 
consumer behavior, in which consumers maximize utility, and the theory of the firm as a 
production function, in which firms maximize profit”. The choice perspective emphasizes 
actors’ free will and autonomy rather than their connectivity and interdependence within 
business relationships (Håkansson et al., 2009; Ford et al. 2011; Ford & Mouzas, 2013; Uzzi, 
1997; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003).  For example, the choice perspective postulates that it is up to 
individual companies to choose how to develop and launch innovative products; decide for the 
right price and promotions; and choose their channels of distributions; it also is up to individual 
managers to choose their course of marketing action.  Consequently, the choice perspective 
assumes a ‘stimulus-response function’ in which changes in relative prices, products, 
promotions and distributions influence responses of the market and thus the profits of the firm.  
 
 James Buchanan was among the first scholars to recognize a preoccupation with such a 
‘science of choice’, as opposed to an examination of how actors achieve the “mutuality of 
advantage from voluntary exchange” (Buchanan, 2001, p. 29). Buchanan’s observation has 
relevance today because globalization and advances in telecommunication have increased the 
inter-connectivity in the business landscape. In today’s context, the limitation of choice 
perspective becomes apparent when we consider the evidence of the dynamic co-evolution that 
takes place between the wills of actors who need to co-exist in an increasingly interconnected 
world and whose co-existence and development is inter-twined (Nowak, 2006, 2011). Consider 
for example, the co-evolution between major suppliers and major customers (Lusch, Vargo & 
Tanniru, 2010; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Volberda  & Lewin, 2003). A major supplier of electric 
batteries, for example, would co-exist and co-evolve with other car manufacturers and 




manufacturers or consumer electronics. Similarly, a retailer, such as Marks & Spencer, would 
co-exist and co-evolve with multiple manufacturers willing to produce private labels for Marks 
& Spencer.  Choice-centric views on business relationships take a generalized view of the 
market or the competition. In practical terms, this means that the choice perspective considers 
the market as a faceless topology in which companies compete with each other to maximize 
their profits.  
 
In contrast, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) relates the actor to specific counterparts 
whether customers or suppliers (Sharma & Henriques, 2005).  Moreover, attempts to draw from 
Giddens’ (1984) ideas on structuration has provided an alternate perspective to examine in a 
more nuanced way the continuing interaction between the actor and its counterparts. This more 
‘external orientation’ in research has also led to debate about the influence of the individual 
firm on wider processes in the business landscape (Håkansson, Olsen & Bakken, 2013; Denrell, 
Fang & Winter, 2003; Johanson & Vahlne, 2011). These processes are largely non-
deterministic and place clear limits on managers’ ability to achieve change in any particular 
direction (Pettigrew, 2014; Caldwell, 2005; Mantere  & Vaara, 2008).  
 
3. THE CONCEPT OF CONSENT  
Our starting point is a view of consent as a reciprocal interactive process between companies. 
Through giving, receiving or denying consent to others, companies seek to address the 
challenges and problems that they face; for example, find new sources of revenues, expand 
distribution, develop and launch new products or services, and reduce operating costs.  
Consider a consumer goods company that seeks the consent of a major retailer for an in-store 
test of a new product line.  Conversely, consider a machinery supplier that may refuse consent 
when one customer seeks to develop a new innovative production process but may agree to a 




similar proposal from another customer in return for an exclusivity agreement. The 
complexities of the business landscape mean that consent is not an instantaneous event that 
involves hard edges of “yes” or “no” choices, but an evolving interactive process over space 
and time. The examples illustrate that consent places business marketing into a network of 
interconnected and interdependent companies (Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995; Venkatraman & Camillus, 1984; Håkansson & Snehota, 1989). For this 
reason, we posit that the study of consent in business marketing would require an investigation 
of involved 1) Actors, 2) Resources and 3) Activities within interconnected business 
relationships (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995; Håkansson et al., 2009; Ford & Mouzas, 2013).  
We also posit that the analysis of consent would require consideration of space and time; this 
would allow us to examine the co-evolution that takes place within an interconnected business 
landscape (Volberda & Lewin, 2003; Ford & Mouzas, 2010). 
 
The Components of Consent 
Consent in business marketing occurs as a combination of two broad components:  
The Moral Component of Consent: Consent between business companies serves to legitimize 
their interaction as well as their individual actions. More fundamentally, consent is the “moral 
component that distinguishes between valid and invalid transfers of alienable rights” (Barnett, 
1986, p. 270).  This means that the use of other actors’ resources would require their consent. 
This applies to physical resources as well as knowledge-based resources (Mouzas & Ford, 
2012). For example, using another actor’s land to build a warehouse would require the property 
owner’s consent; using a creative design or audio-visual product for commercial purposes 
would require the originator’s consent. As different cultures might interpret consent in different 
ways, consent needs to be specified and manifested. The consent may specify how resources 
are be acquired, used or transferred to others; whilst the manifestation of consent may establish 




a “relation of recognition and respect” among counterparts (Markovits, 2004, p.1417). In 
contrast, the absence of consent may lead to an uncontrolled theft of tangible or intangible 
assets, innovations or designs or methods without any reward to the owners of those resources. 
The moral component of consent is widely institutionalized through legal registration of 
patents, copyrights and brands.  The moral component of consent is also widely manifested in 
the tacit or explicit codes of conduct that develop within particular trades, professions, guilds 
and between incumbent market members. 
 
The Instrumental Component of Consent: The instrumental component of consent operates 
as a way station through which business actors allow, authorize or acquiesces to the proposal 
of a counterpart to combine, adapt or exploit resources to which they are not otherwise entitled. 
Thus, the instrumental component of consent is regarded the foundation of contracting among 
actors (Barnett, 1986, Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Mouzas, 2016). For example, by consenting to 
retailers’ proposal to establish a continuous stock replenishment, manufacturers authorize 
retailers to replenish the volume of products that retailers need to operate their business. 
Instrumental consent is an intrinsic part of interaction and can take a similar variety of forms 
to wider interaction itself (Mantere & Vaara, 2008.  Thus at one extreme, consent may be a 
single acquiescence at a particular point in time to a counterpart’s proposal, involving limited 
or major adaptation by either or both counterparts in interaction.  Both the request for and the 
giving of consent may be clearly articulated or implied. For example, consenting to a standard 
form contract implies the acceptance of the terms and conditions defined by the counterparty.  
In contrast, consent can also form part of an interactive process involving multiple and evolving 
reciprocal proposals and counter-proposals over time and in a variety of contexts. For example, 
when manufacturers and retailers negotiate the cooperation in the production of private labels, 
multiple proposal and counter-proposals will evolve with regard to the property rights of the 




jointly developed products.  In this way, consent may be simultaneous or jointly given.  Finally, 
the impact of consent may not be limited to dyadic interactions and have wider effects on other 
business interactions and the interconnected companies, for example through consenting to 
subcontracting in the supply chain.   
4. METHODS   
The empirical study concerns manufacturer-retailer networks involving producers of fast-
moving consumer goods and food retailers in Germany. The evidence illustrates the 
interconnections between the process of consent and the companies’ business marketing. 
 
Material and Social Context 
Manufacturer-retailer networks in Germany comprise manufacturers, such as Mars, Kellogg, 
Nestlé, and Unilever, and retailers, such as Wal-Mart, Metro, Rewe, Lidl and Aldi (Villas-Boas 
& Zhao, 2005). These networks center on fast-moving consumer goods, which are subject to 
frequent product and marketing innovations, and unpredictable changes. Manufacturer-retailer 
networks for consumer goods in Germany generate an annual turnover of €122 billion in a 
market of 82,114,224 consumers (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017).   
 
Sampling process 
Two manufacturers and two retailers form our sample to study the role of consent in business 
marketing. We have chosen this sample in line with existing research on business networks 
(Håkansson et al., 2013; Johanson & Vahlne, 2011; Ford et al., 2011; Ostendorf et al., 2014). 
Extant research on business networks emphasizes the need to move beyond the examination of 
dyadic relationships and examine the impact of dyadic relationships on other interconnected 
relationships (Andersen al., 1994; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Håkansson et al., 2009). The two 
manufacturers and two grocery retailers offered a suitable sample for observing the giving and 




receiving of consent and the associated interactive processes within a manufacturer-retailer 
network (see Figure 1). The selected manufacturers and retailers are pioneers in the 
development and distribution of innovative fast-moving consumer goods. Manufacturer Primus 
is a multinational business company focused on full-priced snack foods while General Foods 
is a nationally important manufacturer of a wide range of food products. Discount Retailers 
focus private labels while Sunways is a grocery retailer with a focus on large hypermarkets and 
a diversified assortment of products. Conceptually, this granular sample comprised 
entrepreneurial actors actively engaged as protagonists in venturing with new and unique 
products and services. 
 
Manufacturer Primus is a multinational business company focused on full-priced, branded 
snack foods while General Foods is a nationally important manufacturer of a wide range of 
food products. Discount Retailers focus on private labels while Sunways is a grocery retailer 
with a focus on large hypermarkets and a diversified assortment of products. We identified 
initial respondents from trade conferences.  Subsequently, we added new respondents within 
the organizations according to their potential contribution to the development of theory.  In 
total, we identified and engaged over a two-year period with 12 different respondents, 

























Data Collection  
Data collection approach: We used the case study method (Tsoukas, 1989; Ragin & Becker, 
1992; Gibbert, Ruigrock & Wicki, 2008) to employ a two-year engagement with practitioners 
and participant observation, conduct interviews with respondents and collect archival records 
as manifestations of consent (memoranda of understanding, minutes and contracts). Combining 
these techniques provided a way to collaborate with respondents, such as Business Managers, 




Category Managers and Account Managers, and generate understanding about their 
experiences (Cope, 2005, 2011). This approach was particularly suited to the purposes of the 
present research because we investigated the role of consent in business marketing within the 
real-life context of manufacturer-retailer networks. In this context, the boundaries between 
phenomenon of consent and the material and social context are not clearly evident. 
Consequently, multiple sources of evidence are needed, and triangulation of evidence is 
indispensable (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
 
Data Collection: One member of the research team, who had local knowledge and prior work 
experience in the industry, conducted participant observation, interviews with practitioners and 
collected manifestations of consent. Gaining access to manufacturer-retailer networks was 
difficult. Discount Retailers were particularly secretive and reluctant to release sensitive 
archival information. Engaging with the respondents involved a major shift in the researcher’s 
role to that of observer rather than participant. Prior local knowledge and ties, however, 
facilitated the identification of appropriate sources of information. We used participant 
observation, interviews and archival records to develop a contextual epistemology and 
evidence-based explanation of the role of consent in business marketing.  We logged 78 field 
observations (including impromptu chats and meetings) about how the practice of consent 
occurs, the forms that consent takes and the variety of contingencies into a field-tracking 
system shortly after they occurred. We also collected 267 press releases, 8 annual reports and 
obtained 28 electronic copies of manifestations of consent (framework agreements) between 
manufacturers and retailers. We stopped collecting data when for the purpose of our research 
question a theoretical saturation had been reached. 
 
 









Table 1: Overview of Data Collection 
Companies/ Group of companies 
 
 
4     Manufacturers and retailers 
Respondents 
 
12   Managers 
 
 









8      Annual reports 
 
 
Manifestations of consent 
 
 




When we finished the first draft of the study, we conducted feedback interviews with the senior 
managers to check our interpretations. This feedback proved extremely relevant in fine-tuning 
our interpretations and testing the internal validity of our findings. 
 
Data Analysis 
Consistent with previous work on studying networks of business relationships (Borgatti & 
Foster, 2003; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003; Ford & Håkansson, 2013), and in line with studies on 
qualitative methods (Silverman, 2000; Gibbert, Ruigrock & Wicki, 2008), our data analysis 
involved a productive interplay between three elements:  1) empirical evidence, 2) the 
theoretical shift from choice to consent, 3) the research question on the role of consent in 




business marketing. The process of making sense of our findings encountered three challenges: 
1) the problem of inter-firm complexity, 2) the problem of time (periodic interactions over 
time) and 3) comparison of findings. We observed that giving and receiving consent by 
suppliers and customers was exceedingly stratified, time-consuming and complex because 
interactions between companies were individualized, recurrent and often unpredictable. Both 
sampling and theoretical framework were conducive to our effort to address this challenge: 
firstly, we focused on the interactions between two producers and two retailers and examined 
the dynamics of the observed network, as well as the inter-connections in clusters to generate 
reliable comparisons. Secondly, we develop a theoretical structure to analyze our observations 
on giving and receiving consent in space and time. The purpose of our analysis was to identify 
the mechanisms that generated the events that we observed. The method of inference by 
postulating mechanisms, which are capable of generating the events, we observed, is referred 
to as ‘retroduction’ (Bhaskar, 1978; Sayer, 2000). We re-categorized our empirical 
observations of actors, resources and activities in space and time; then we classified them 
according to the chronological events list that we used in our data collection. This systematic 
and guided process of data analysis allowed us to connect concrete empirical observations of 

















5. EVIDENCE FROM MANUFACTURER-RETAILER NETWORKS 
The companies that we investigated had all worked in the field of consumer goods for many 
years; each company was a major operator in their specific field of business with distinct 
capabilities, backgrounds, experiences and roles (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Respondents’ Business, Background and Function 



































































































Manufacturer Primus is a successful multinational producer of fast-moving consumer goods 
and has built its business based on the basis of premium brands in the category of snack foods. 
Primus had invested over €200 million in the development of innovative snack foods in the 




previous three years. During this time, Primus had also invested over €100 million annually in 
advertising in order to create brand awareness for its innovative products. Primus had a 
presence in 180 countries, strong support from its US parent company and a market share of 
circa 33% in the category of snack foods in Germany. Primus’ declared principle was to be the 
market leader or the major challenger/contender for that place in each product category in 
which it operated.  
General Foods is Primus’ main competitor.  General Foods is a manufacturer of national 
importance represented in many product categories of food. General Foods has a highly 
developed production site in Germany as well as excellent Research & Development facilities.  
However, their brands in the category of snack foods are weak and their market shares of circa 
5% had been declining over the previous three years. As a generalist producer, General Foods 
produces private labels for a number of Discount Retailers. Private label business provides 
volume for manufacturer General Foods and contributes towards full utilization of its 
production capacities. But the private label business is less profitable, with operating margins 
of 5-10% compared with branded brands for which operating margins of 40-50% are common. 
Moreover, Discount Retailers possess property rights over private labels and thus can dictate 
all terms and conditions about how private labels are manufactured and sold.  
Sunways is a grocery retailer focused on large retail hypermarkets of more than 4000m² and a 
diversified assortment of food and non-food products. Retailer Sunways’ assortment includes 
both branded and private labels, but branded full-price products remain Sunways’ core business 
at 85% of its total.  
80 million Consumers in Germany and those elsewhere faced economic uncertainty related to 
the financial crises after many years of growth in their incomes and spending power.  Purchase 
behavior and brand loyalty were increasingly being affected by consumers’ emphasis on price, 









Developing Private Label Snack Foods 
Retailer Sunways’ financial performance had deteriorated in the years following the economic 
crisis of 2008. As consumers’ price sensitivity increased, the demand for low-price products 
and private labels soared. Nielsen data showed that the growth rate for private labels was 15% 
annually. Sunways traced their dismal performance to their loss of competiveness in the retail 
business and the rise in demand for private labels within Discount Retailers. Discounters were 
not a new problem for Sunways because the discount segment had been increasing its share in 
recent decades.  Sunways had not expected the sudden acceleration in private label demand. 
Discount Retailers’ assortment of products consisted of 80% private labels offered at 60% of 
the price of the equivalent branded products, which they also had in their assortment.  Sunways’ 
new top management team was committed to restoring the hypermarkets’ competitiveness.  
Suddenly, Sunways started to view private labels business as a way of offering competitive 
prices and regaining consumer preferences in highly competitive product categories. Sunways 
did not have its own manufacturing capabilities so it needed innovative and flexible 
manufacturers capable of delivering their requirements in snack foods.  Retailer Sunways was 
reluctant to ask manufacturer General Foods to produce private labels for them, as General 
Foods already produced for their competitors, the Discount Retailers.  Instead, Sunways’ new 
top management considered that collaboration with manufacturer Primus would be a business 
opportunity because Primus was a world-leading innovative company and a preferred supplier 
of branded products for Sunways.  Nonetheless, Sunways’ category managers who had been 




with the retailer for many years were not enthusiastic about the idea of introducing private 
labels with Primus. They knew from previous annual trade negotiations in 2007 and 2008 that 
manufacturer Primus’ policy was to build its own strong brands and not to produce private 
labels for other retailers under the slogan: “We don’t produce our products for anyone else”.  
 
Pursuing the opportunity of private labels  
Pursuit of business opportunities presented by private labels involved a number of proposals, 
responses, and re-responses by several companies.  The giving and withholding of consent 
enabled, constrained, encouraged or facilitated the counterparts’ business marketing. The 
subsequent interactions between retailer Sunways, manufacturer Primus, manufacturer General 
Foods and the Discount Retailers illustrate this process: 
 
May 2009, Retailer Sunways: Sunways’ Category Manager for Snack Foods, Franz Josef was 
instructed to develop plans to pursue the business opportunity of private labels. Sunways’ 
purchasing and finance departments worked out the financial implications of various 
price/volume options. A series of internal meetings focused on the feasibility and viability of 
the private labels opportunity. The business case was supported by the assumption that private 
labels would result in produce incremental revenues and improved margins as a result of lower 
prices. The investment analysis also took into account the low opportunity cost of capital for 
Sunways (the cost of not investing in other opportunities with similar systemic risk).  
Retailer Sunways’ Board of Directors gave its consent to the proposal to open of formal 
negotiations with manufacturers in August 2009.   
 
September 2009: Retailer Sunways and Manufacturer Primus: Sunways started to seek the 
consent to their proposal from Primus by using its annual trade negotiations with Manufacturer 




Primus.  Sunways pointed out that the volume of business between the two counterparts was 
declining and that they both needed to discover new ways to address increasing consumer 
demand for low-price products. Sunways’ Category Manager Franz Josef presented market 
research evidence that consumers’ price-sensitivity was increasing rapidly and that after the 
economic crisis of 2008 private label business represented a business opportunity that was 
worth pursuing.  He claimed that: “these new circumstances require new unconventional 
pathways”. 
 
Category Manager Franz Josef sought manufacturer Primus’ consent to jointly develop and 
market three innovative snack food product lines as private labels that could generate up to 15 
% incremental revenues and 30% incremental profits. He said that if Primus agreed to develop 
and market innovative private labels, Sunways would vigorously support these business 
initiatives with 10% incremental shelf space for Primus and extensive point-of-sale promotions 
including permanent price-reductions and point of sale visibility.  
 
October 2009: Retailer Sunways and Manufacturer Primus: Primus’ Director of Key 
Account Management Klaus did not consent to Sunways’ request to produce private labels, 
explaining that they did not have permission from the US parent company. Instead, Klaus 
proposed the launch of a series of new highly innovative snack food branded products, which 
he claimed would command a premium price.  Klaus argued that:  “In these new circumstances, 
we will pursue unconventional pathways with our unique brands that generate strong 
consumer off-takes”. 
 
Klaus presented prototypes of the new innovative products and a detailed launch plan that was 
supported by heavy media investments. Klaus finalized his presentation with a pledge:  




“We will check the attractiveness of the proposal with a market test and will conduct a pilot 
study that will guide a subsequent roll-out of the initiative”. Retailer Sunways’ management 
was not surprised by this reaction but they felt distracted by the vigorous counter-initiative of 
the manufacturer. Sunways demanded more robust evidence that there was a business 
opportunity in new brands that was worth pursuing before it would consent to the counter-
initiative.   
   
December 2009:  Retailer Sunways and Manufacturer Primus:  Test market results for the 
new branded products from Primus were encouraging in terms of generating strong consumer 
interest. Consumer off-take data revealed a volume increase of 28% in the test group versus a 
control group.  Despite this evidence, Sunways did not consent to Primus’ launch of new 
products in their retail outlets. Retailer Sunways was faced with the rapid rise of Discount 
Retailers and they argued that the manufacturer’s initiative was addressing the wrong problem. 
The retailer felt that innovative value products within private label business were a neglected 
business and that any delay in taking bold action would diminish Sunways’ capability to 
compete in an exceedingly price-sensitive business landscape. According to retailer Sunways: 
 “As retailers, we are representatives of consumer demand and need to respond to market 
developments”. To convey this message to manufacturer Primus more emphatically, Sunways 
unilaterally delisted seven Primus’ product items introduced during 2009. Category Manager 
Franz Josef then renewed his attempt to seek the consent of manufacturer Primus to a 
partnership with Sunways in developing and launching private labels. 
 
April 2009: Retailer Sunways and Manufacturer General Foods: Following the 
disappointing outcome of their attempt to seek the consent of manufacturer Primus, retailer 
Sunways invited manufacturer General Foods to work with them in the area of private labels. 




The two companies reached consensus on two relevant insights: firstly that the increasing price-
sensitivity of consumers dictated new responses; and secondly, that any new proposition should 
build on unique and innovative products able to generate strong consumer interest. Both 
counterparts agreed to move into the next phase of jointly developing and evaluating feasible 
options as soon as possible. 
 
June 2010: Retailer Sunways and Manufacturer Primus: By the time of the second Quarterly 
Business Review between retailer Sunways and Primus, Primus’ business revenues with 
retailer Sunways had decreased by 24.6% compared with the previous year. Sunways Category 
Manager Franz Josef notified Primus’ Key Account Director Klaus that because of this dismal 
performance the manufacturer was about to lose the status of “Category Captain” in their stores. 
This title indicates the status of preferred supplier for a leading manufacturer and entailed 
privileges in terms of collaboration, influence on store planograms, the merchandising, 
promotion and pricing policies.   
 
July 2010: Retailer Sunways and Manufacturer Primus: Manufacturer Primus continued to 
lose business with retailer Sunways. Primus’ Key Account Director Klaus felt captive within 
the existing business relationship with retailer Sunways.  As Sunways delisted the newly 
introduced Primus’ product items, the decline of Primus’ business in Sunways’ hypermarkets 
accelerated. Klaus felt that his company was being prevented by Sunways from pursuing their 
marketing of innovative, full-priced premium brands in the snack foods product category. 
Primus made a final attempt to convince Sunways’ top management that simply imitating 
Discount Retailers would reduce consumer choice and would ultimately harm the overall 
product category of snack food as well as retailer Sunways.  This attempt had no effect. Primus’ 
Key Account Director Klaus realized that there was no joint vision between the businesses or 




any prospect of consent to a joint course of action.  To break out of his perceived ‘captivity’, 
Klaus sought to develop business in the alternative channels of distribution such as Gas 
Stations, Hotels, Restaurants, Cafes (HORECA) and Convenience Stores.  These outlets were 
growing in importance because of changes in customer shopping habits and increasing 
mobility. The effort to pursue new business opportunities with HORECA and Convenience 
Stores did produce incremental revenue, but generated lower profitability than business with 
retailer Sunways because of the increased logistical and sales force costs of obtaining and 
managing business with smaller and geographically dispersed outlets. 
 
September 2010: Retailer Sunways and Manufacturer Primus: In September 2010 during the 
annual negotiations for the year 2011, Primus’ Key Account Director Klaus sought retailer 
Sunway’s consent to a new, account-specific marketing.  This involved the launch of an 
exclusive mega-pack product (with three times of the original volume offered at 15% lower 
net-net price) that would only be available in the retail outlets of Sunways.  Category Manager 
Franz Josef welcomed the Primus initiative as a step in the right direction; nonetheless, he 
could not consent to it on the grounds that the proposition would not sufficiently help Sunways 
compete with Discount Retailers that sell primarily private labels. Hans, the Purchasing 
Manager for Sunways added categorically:  
“We simply can’t ignore that private labels are priced at 60% of full-priced brands”.  
 
October 2010: Retailer Sunways and General Foods 
Meanwhile, Sunways’ Category Manager Franz Josef had been surprised by General Foods’ 
initiative to offer an exclusive brand for retailer Sunways at private label price (60% of full-
priced brands) instead of a private label.  General Foods’ proposal envisaged that the 
manufacturer would assume all R&D costs and that the brand will be sold exclusively within 




Sunways. Franz Josef welcomed the initiative as constructive move but a few days later, 
Retailer Sunways lawyers drafted a formal dissent letter to General Foods explaining that the 
proposition would be viable only if General Foods would consent to transfer the intellectual 
property rights for the proposed brand to retailer Sunways. 
December 2010:  Each of the three counterparts, Sunways, General Foods and Primus wished 
to avoid starting 2011 without a framework agreement between them.  Discussions led to the 
following consents between them: 
 
The Consents between Sunways and Primus: 
Manufacturer Primus would produce an exclusive mega-pack for Sunways at a permanently 
low price (equivalent to 60% of the price of full-price brands).  In return, retailer Sunways 
agreed to distribute all Primus’ new innovative products at full-price. Primus would remain 
Category Captain within Sunways; and their collaboration would be extended to include the 
discounted segment.   
 
The Consents between Sunways and General Foods: 
General Foods would develop and produce an exclusive brand for retailer Sunways offered at 
60% of full-price brands. Research and development costs would be shared by the two 
counterparts, and intellectual property rights would remain with the manufacturer for the first 
five years but would then be transferred to the retailer. Nielsen consumer data published in 
March 2011 indicated that Sunways exclusive brand and mega-pack offer were effective in 
gaining strong consumer demand.  
  
September 2011: Discount Retailers 




Discount Retailers were wary of these developments but adopted a “wait-and-see” attitude.  
However, during the annual trade negotiations that started in September 2011, Discount 
Retailers gave their consent to manufacturers for a listing of a number of manufacturer brands 
with strong consumer demand provided that they were supported by price promotions. The 
share of manufacturer brands within Discount Retailers’ assortment rose by ten percent during 




6. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
This research uses a conceptual framework built on the three elements of actors, activities and 
resources to examine how business marketing evolves as an interactive process of consent over 
time, as illustrated in Table 3.  
 

















 Existing jointness between 
General Foods and Sunways 
in developing value brands 
and private labels   
  
Existing jointness between 
Primus and Sunways in 
developing premium brands 
 
 Existing jointness between 
Discount Retailers and 
General Foods seeking  




 Co-evolution between 
Sunways and Primus, 
initially constrained by goal 
incompatibility 
 
 Co-evolution between 
Sunways and General 
Foods initially constrained 
by continuing co-evolution 




 Evolving  consumer 
demand and counterparts’ 




  performance affect co-







 Sunways lacks private label 
resources  
 
 General Food dependent on its 
private label resources and 




 Discount retailers lack brand 
resources.   
 
   
 Sunways pursuit of private label 
resource depends on continuing 
interaction with two available 
manufacturers. 
 
 General Food considers the 
development of exclusive 
brands as way to reduce 
dependency on its private label 
products. 
 
 General Food’s development of 
branded products depends on 
Sunways’ interactions with 
Primark and subsequently 
Primark’s consent to transfer 
property rights for 5 years 
 
 Discount Retailers’ consider the 
opportunity of discounted 
brands only when this resource 
was exploited by Sunways. 
Extension of their resources 
towards branded products 
depends on manufacturers’ 








 Sunways retail operations are 
negatively affected by  Discount 
Retailers  performance  
 
 General Food’s development of 
branded products emerges as a 
result of failed Sunways-Primus 
interactions 
  
 Primus discovers the opportunity 
to develop a discounted mega-
pack for Sunways only when 
business hemorrhage was 
unstoppable  
  
 Discount Retailers discover the 
opportunity of discounted brands 
when market evidence emerged 
that Sunways’ venture was 
succeeding 
 
   
 Sunways’ development of  
private labels depends on its 
interactions with Primus and 
General Foods 
 
 General Food’s pursuit of 
opportunity depends on 
Sunways’ interactions with 
Primus 
 
 Primus’s pursuit of the 
opportunity will depend on 
Sunways consent to pricing 
 
 
 Discount Retailers extension of 
their resources towards branded 
products depends on continuing 









Table 3 shows some of the multiplicity of interactions between business companies within the 
general spatiotemporal context of a global recession and enhanced consumer price sensitivity.  
The interactions examined are those between the activities, resources and individual and 
corporate actors that make up manufacturers Primus and General Foods and retailers Sunways 
and Discount Retailers.   
 
Our starting point is the situation of network space in 2008.  This situation and the position of 
the companies within it is the outcome of multiple interactions over many years, each built on 
an evolving pattern of supplier-customer relationships and a pattern of proposals, consents, 
refusals, subterfuges.  Each of the relationships at this time is comprised of complex actor 
bonds between individuals and subgroups, ties between company resources and links between 
their activities. 
 
Sunways management team needed to address the sharp decline in its own business 
performance and relationship with its retailer customers.  Sunways traced this decline to the 
rise in demand for private labels developed by Discount Retailers.  But a move towards private 
labels could only be achieved if Sunways could obtain the consent to a change in the path of 
resource evolution, activity specialization and actor jointness with one or both of only two 
potentially capable manufacturers.  Sunways had existing relationships and well-developed 
actor bonds (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Wilson, 2004). The business 
marketing of the two retailers and the two manufacturers Primus and General Foods were 
enabled and constrained in their approach to each other by the prior interactions and developed 
relationships between them. For example, Sunways’ category managers knew from previous 
annual trade negotiations in 2007 and 2008 that manufacturer Primus’ policy was not aligned 
with Sunway’s intent to develop private labels. 





Table 3 illustrates some of the ways in which the initiatives of each of the involved companies: 
Sunways, Primus, General Foods, the Discount Retailers and of value-seeking Consumers. 
Interactions between the actors, activities and resources of the companies proceeded as a step-
wise process of proposal and response which incorporated previous, anticipated, achieved and 
modified consents. The practice of interactive consent linked the initiatives of particular 
companies to the structure of the business landscape. This highlights the interpretation of 
business marketing as “effectuation processes” that take “a set of means (resources, actors, 
activities) as given” and focuses on the effects that can be co-produced with that set of means 
(Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 245). This brings us to the essence of business marketing as a continuing 
process of consent between interacting actors which serves to deploy resources through new 
means-end relations.  
 
The intellectual lens of consent provides for in-depth analysis into these ‘effectuation 
processes’ and to identify how business actors discover and act upon possibilities to achieve 
mutuality of advantage (Barnett, 1986; Buchanan, 2001).  Specifically, the study provides 
evidence that business marketing takes the form of multiple, nested threads of consent practices 
through which actors address current problems or respond to the initiatives of counterparts. 
Examples of these problems in the case study are provided by Sunways’ lack of 
competitiveness in the segment of private labels; Primus’ decline of business in Sunways’ 
hypermarkets or General Foods’ need to develop stronger brands. As well as the positive 
consents of companies to the proposals of counterparts, the case study also shows the role of 
negative responses to actors’ initiatives in the evolution of business relationships and the wider 
business network.  Examples include the Primus dissent to offer private labels, Sunways’ 
dissent to Primus’ launch of new products in their retail outlets or Sunways’ request that the 




intellectual property rights for the products were transferred from General Foods to retailer 
Sunways.  For firms innovative products are engines of growth and competitiveness because 
they generate attention and interest among consumers (Hoffmann and  Broekhuizen, 2010; 
Sorescu, Chandy and  Prabhu, 2003; Ostendorf et al., 2014). 
The study provides evidence that actors’ approaches evolved as an opportunity to deploy new 
means-end relations (Kirzner, 1997).  This development followed a period of agonizing with 
mounting problems, such as deterioration of performance compared with particular 
competitors. Despite the impact of exogenous shocks on business performance (such as the 
economic crisis in 2008/9), business marketing did not follow simply from individual company 
decisions but was enacted on the basis of an interactive process of multiple consent-giving and 
receiving over time. In other words, business marketing was mediated by the consent of 
counterparts. For example, Sunways’ management did not simply choose to enter the business 
of private labels. Similarly, manufacturer General Foods did not simply choose to boost 
branded products and Discount Retailers did not simply reconsider their private label choices. 
Instead, the initiatives of actors that we first observed as events were subject to the consent of 
others that enabled, constrained or revised the actors’ intentions.  
To move the analysis of data towards theoretical implications, we built on Tsoukas’ (1989) 
work on the validity of idiographic explanations and considered the role of consent as a 
‘generative’ mechanism that produced the events that we observed.  Processes of consent 
answer ‘why’ and ‘how’ certain events in business marketing occur; they are the necessary 
mechanisms of acting in a set of contingencies (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). This is evidenced in 
the consents between retailer Sunways and manufacturers Primus and General Foods and the 
consent between Discount Retailers and their manufacturers.   
 
 





7. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The case evidence suggests that the mediating role of consent is detected at four levels:  firstly 
as a stratifying process; secondly as recursive practice; thirdly as energizing interaction and 
fourthly as economizing activities, resources and actors.  
 
(1)  Consent as a Stratifying Process 
The consents recorded between retailers and manufacturers were neither instantaneous nor 
independent of each other.  Consent giving and receiving involved a series of time-consuming 
and interconnected initiative-response-and-re-responses between multiple actors.  Hence, 
consent generated a stratifying process with multiple interconnected threads.  More 
fundamentally, the evidence of a stratifying process of interaction is in line with the theoretical 
shift away from economic inevitability (Sarasvathy, 2001). Conceptions of economic 
inevitability (Davidsson, Delmar & Wiklund, 2006; De Rond &  Thietart, 2007) build on a 
science of choice that assumes causation processes that “take a particular effect as given and 
focus on selecting between means to create that effect” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 245). The 
evidence of multiple, parallel, interconnected threads of interaction illustrates effectuation 
processes that take inherent resources, actors, activities and focus on co-production of aspiring 
effects (Sarasvathy, 2001). The observation of stratifying process of interaction through 
consent differs diametrically from individualistic choice models of decision-making (Porter, 
1981, 2008; Pettigrew, 2014). 
  
(2) Recursive practice 
Consent generates a recursive practice manifested by the repetitiveness of interaction, 
evidenced as periodic meetings, performance reviews, quarterly business reviews as well as 




annual negotiation processes. Table 3 highlights the recursive ways in which business 
interaction emerges in relational space and evolves ‘time and again’ as actors seek to address 
their problems and pursue opportunities that are subject to the consent of other actors.  A 
consequence of recursive practice is that business marketing does not appear as collection of 
isolated, unrelated fine-grained practices in which time is simply a linear process.  Instead, we 
can observe that actors’ business marketing takes place as a recurrent pattern of episodes, 
incidents, joint action and reviews within continuously evolving social and material structure 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2011). Therefore, business marketing emerges as a process that takes 
place within a temporal frame that stretched years into the past and the future. 
 
 
(3) Energizing interaction 
The case study indicates that business marketing is likely to be interactive, multi-actor, multi-
faceted and irregular in both its frequency and significance. This is in line with previous work 
on choice, chance, and inevitability (De Rond & Thietart, 2007 p. 546) that points out that 
business initiatives emerge “as a result of (unplanned) interactions between the consequences 
of choices made by various, sometimes unrelated, actors”. Questions remain about the role of 
human agency; and how interactions enable business marketing to evolve. Consent affects the 
process of business interaction but does not have a single direction. Consent energizes 
subsequent interactions because it rests on an inter-cognitive achievement between actors. If 
actors’ actual meeting of minds is based on informed and voluntary consent, then the prospect 
of counterparts’ mutual gains will guide and speed up subsequent interactions (Mnookin, 
Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000). The energizing role of consent supports scholarly work that 
pertains to the co-creation of business opportunities (Tan & Tan, 2005); as well as the 




theoretical implications for negotiating and developing trust with one's co-creators (Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001).  
 
(4) Economizing activities, resources and actors  
The case study indicates that consent economizes activities, resources and actors (Håkansson, 
Olsen & Bakken, 2013). Table 3 provides examples of how the giving and receiving of consent 
redirects actors’ initiatives and how actors, resources and activities are dynamically 
reconfigured to increase productivity. The evidence indicates ‘discursive practices’ that include 
challenging traditional practices, objectifying benefits and means-end relations and reframing 
cooperation (Vaara, Kleymann, & Seristö, 2004; Vaara, E., & Tienar, 2008). New activities 
emerge and existing ones may be adapted as proposals or responses to proposals in continuing 
relationships. These proposals and responses maintain or alter actors’ less productive 
specializations. Proposals and responses are human interactions that could lead to changes in 
the division of labor and re-allocation of entitlements. Specifically, we observed the initial 
reluctance of manufacturer Primus to develop an exclusive offering for Sunways because 
Primus wished to remain a specialized provider of non-customer-specific, full-priced brands. 
Because opportunities that business actors discover are idiosyncratic (Denrell et al., 2003), the 
development of Sunways’ private labels depended on which manufacturer would consent to 
their proposals.  Similarly, the productivity of General Foods would depend on Sunways’ retail 
resources in hypermarkets. These resources and the entitlements held over them are reshaped 
over time and redirected towards more productive uses. For example, Primus consented to 
move from ubiquitous brands to a customer-exclusive offering and General Foods consented 
to the transfer of property rights to Sunways after five years. The evolution of consent also 
affects the characteristics of actors themselves in space and time as in changes in the 
characterization of Primus as a manufacturer of brands or General Foods’ as simply a producer 




of products. The economizing of activities, resources and actors (Håkansson et al., 2013) is 
evidenced in the evolving movement of retailers into roles traditionally performed by 
manufacturers and vice versa. 
 
Choice and Consent 
The importance of seeking the consent of counterparts in the evolution of business marketing 
does not remove the role of choice (Rond & Thietart, 2007; Sminia & De Rond, 2012) or reduce 
its importance for business success. Business marketers face clear choices about their overall 
approach to consent, the ways in which they will seek and give it and the variations in consent 
they will expect in different areas of their operations. Seeking the consent of others inevitably 
places limits on discretion which business actors are willing to accept to a greater or lesser 
degree.  Business marketing involves a trade-off between retaining independence and 
flexibility at the expense of limiting access to or adapting the resources of others.  Similarly, 
the giving of consent provides benefits to others and may involve costs of adaptation 
(Buchanan, 1979; Brennan & Turnbull, 1999). Business marketing requires clarity in complex 
and multiple choices between viewing business as a zero-sum game or one of mutual gain.  The 
giving and seeking of consent involves trade-offs between short and long term benefits for each 
business actor and its counterparts.  These trade-offs require business actors to take a view of 
the evolution of their relationships and their wish to take or give short or long-term benefits.  
Therefore, consent is not a neutral phenomenon and all consent exists within a framework of 
understanding. All organizations operate with a consent on the basis of their own and their 
counterparts’ resources; and all organizations have to deal with consent based on the resources 
of their counterparts.  Thus by consenting to be dependent on the resources of others, 
organizations are able to develop a productive co-evolution with other organizations, 
rationalize their respective resources and achieve joint gains. 






8. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS   
The findings from this study highlight four important managerial lessons:  Firstly, the study re-
emphasizes the interdependence between companies.  Therefore, business interaction is a 
research tool as well as a vehicle for business marketing. Seeking the necessary consent of 
others in business marketing is not a single event. Instead, consent is a process that evolves 
through interaction, often with multiple interconnected counterparts.  The centrality of role of 
consent in business marketing suggests that actors need to reverse the conventional sequence 
of taking positions, finding out the issues, and then perhaps ignoring the interests of their 
counterparts. Instead, helping the other side meet its “behind-the-table” challenges (Sebenius, 
2013 p.7 ), business actors need to: 1) identify the hidden interests of their counterparts, 2) 
address issues jointly, and 3) avoid taking positions prematurely. Consent has multiple strands. 
Consent is sequential and cumulative. These characteristics suggest that companies need to 
review the past and potential future effects of consent on their activities, resources and actors 
themselves. The willingness to stand back and review evolving consent may enable business 
actors to avoid the common problem often expressed as, “How on earth did we get into this 
position”!   
 
Secondly, the study indicates that business marketers and purchasers need to express and 
manifest their consent in such a way that their reasonable expectations are stated with certainty 
and predictability for their counterparts; and they need to include mechanisms for periodic 
business reviews and re-negotiation to deal with unforeseen contingencies. For example, in the 
context of international marketing, different cultures might have a different deduction of the 
concept of consent; manifestations of consent, periodic reviews and renegotiation mechanisms 




might address misunderstandings and unforeseen eventualities. In this way, business contracts 
create relevant reference points (Hart & Moore, 2008; Fehr, Hart & Zehnder, 2011) and 
enhance firms’ organizational capabilities (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012; Mouzas and Blois, 
2013).     
    
Thirdly, marketers and purchasers need to be aware that although interaction will determine 
the achievement of consent, the currency that actors bring into this interaction process is their 
entitlements or access to resources. Actors’ entitlements are not restricted to the ownership of 
physical resources such as products, production capacity or distributional resources. 
Entitlements may refer to intellectual assets, capabilities, brands, patents and innovation. By 
building a pool of resources that is unique, creative and original, organizations improve the 




9. CONCLUSION  
The paper has highlighted the mediating role of consent in business marketing. The paper 
provides insights into an interactive practice of consent between variously interconnected 
counterparts. The data emphasizes the value of re-defining the concept of choice (Buchanan, 
2001; Williamson, 2002) away from its usual associations with discrete and independent 
decision-making and rational planning towards the idea of choice being part of an evolutionary 
discursive practice of proposal, response and re-response (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Sarasvathy, 
2001; Seidl, 2007; Johanson & Vahlne, 2011). In this interpretation, business marketing in 
relationally embedded organizations involves the actors in webs of interdependent 
relationships, patterns of recursive interactions and constellations of heterogeneously 




distributed resources and competences. The outcomes of companies’ choices are contingent 
upon the consent of their counterparts and this consent is not an instantaneous event with hard 
edges of yes and no.  The study provides evidence that the opportunities that actors discover 
are idiosyncratic (Denrell et al., 2003) in their particular relational space and their pursuit over 
time is conditioned by an interactive and reciprocal practice of consent in which actors’ inter-
actions and resources, and the actors themselves, co-evolve to produce the events that we 
observe (Sarasvathy, 2001).  This interactive and reciprocal practice of seeking and giving of 
actors’ consent is often not visible, and it is not given to us transparently; it lies under the 
surface of observed events, which ostensibly appear as the result of actors’ choice (Buchanan, 
2001; Williamson, 2002).  
 
The complexity of the opaque processes of business marketing make it possible that researchers 
and business managers may underestimate the interactive and time-consuming nature of 
seeking and reaching consent. The study makes it clear that business marketing is not simply a 
program that actors develop and choose to apply. The success of actors’ choices is triggered 
only in conducive circumstances, which depend on the consent of counterparts.  The mediating 
role of consent means that successful business marketing depend on providing the rationales 
and resources for other actors to react in compatible directions and seize contingent 
opportunities. Hence, it appears that consent rests on some form of wholeness and coherence.  
Productive consent requires the integration of contextual potentials and internal capabilities, 
the synchronization of short-term and long-term considerations, the co-existence of 
cooperation and competition, the harmonization of the general and the specific, and the 
symbiosis of the past and the future. 
         
 





10. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current study has been limited to an investigation of manufacturer-retailer networks in the 
fast-moving consumer goods. These business networks demonstrate a high degree of 
connectivity among organizations that engage in continuing business relationships and depend 
on the resources of their counterpart retailers or manufacturers to address consumers’ 
constantly evolving demand for products and services. It would be valuable to investigate 
interactive practice of consent in different contexts. What kind of insights can we gain that 
display different levels of collaboration and competiveness?  Voluntary and informed consent 
appears highly relevant in financial industries, as well as in online transactions or mobile phone 
applications. As the constellations of actors, resources and interactions vary in these industries, 
we may posit that the nature and process of consent will differ. The role of consent can only be 
studied over recursive time. Recursive time captures the idea of continuity expressed in 
recursive practices, the pre-eminence of repetitions and organizational habits, as well as 
institutionalized forms of fixed sequences of interactions. Future research need to pay more 
attention to interactive practices over recursive time such as recurrent meetings, periodic 
business reviews, periodic task reviews, annual operating plans or periodic contract 
negotiations (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008). This direction of future research on consent could 
be linked with the capability of firms to learn how to contract and perform in continuing 
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Figure 1: Manufacturer-Retailer Network  













Table 1: Overview of Data Collection 
Companies/ Group of companies 
 
 
4     Manufacturers and retailers 
Respondents 
 
12   Managers 
 
 









8      Annual reports 
 
 
Manifestations of consent 
 
 






Table 2: Respondents’ Business, Background and Function 



























































































































































































 Existing jointness between 
General Foods and Sunways 
in developing value brands 
and private labels   
  
Existing jointness between 
Primus and Sunways in 
developing premium brands 
 
 Existing jointness between 
Discount Retailers and 
General Foods seeking  




 Co-evolution between 
Sunways and Primus, 
initially constrained by goal 
incompatibility 
 
 Co-evolution between 
Sunways and General 
Foods initially constrained 
by continuing co-evolution 




 Evolving  consumer 
demand and counterparts’ 
performance affect co-








 Sunways lacks private label 
resources  
 
 General Food dependent on its 
private label resources and 




 Discount retailers lack brand 
resources.   
 
   
 Sunways pursuit of private label 
resource depends on continuing 
interaction with two available 
manufacturers. 
 
 General Food considers the 
development of exclusive 
brands as way to reduce 
dependency on its private label 
products. 
 
 General Food’s development of 
branded products depends on 
Sunways’ interactions with 
Primark and subsequently 
Primark’s consent to transfer 
property rights for 5 years 
 
 Discount Retailers’ consider the 
opportunity of discounted 
brands only when this resource 
was exploited by Sunways. 
Extension of their resources 
towards branded products 
depends on manufacturers’ 
consent to discount their brands  
  
  Sunways retail operations are 
negatively affected by  Discount 
Retailers  performance  
 Sunways’ development of  
private labels depends on its 










 General Food’s development of 
branded products emerges as a 
result of failed Sunways-Primus 
interactions 
  
 Primus discovers the opportunity 
to develop a discounted mega-
pack for Sunways only when 
business hemorrhage was 
unstoppable  
  
 Discount Retailers discover the 
opportunity of discounted brands 
when market evidence emerged 
that Sunways’ venture was 
succeeding 
 
   
interactions with Primus and 
General Foods 
 
 General Food’s pursuit of 
opportunity depends on 
Sunways’ interactions with 
Primus 
 
 Primus’s pursuit of the 
opportunity will depend on 
Sunways consent to pricing 
 
 
 Discount Retailers extension of 
their resources towards branded 
products depends on continuing 
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